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Representing Low-Wage Workers in the 
Absence of a Class: The Peculiar Case of 
Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act and the Underenforcement of 
Minimum Labor Standards 
Craig Becker and Paul Strauss† 
On August 30, 2007, the California Supreme Court held 
that an arbitration agreement allowing employees to pursue 
state-law wage claims only through individual arbitration pro-
ceedings, without resort to a class action, would, in many cases, 
“lead to a de facto waiver [of statutory rights] and would im-
permissibly interfere with employees’ ability . . . to enforce the 
[State’s] overtime laws.”1 The court based its holding on analy-
sis of the “real world obstacles to the vindication of [employees’] 
right to overtime pay through individual [action].”2 The court 
reasoned that class actions are needed because individual 
claims “offer no more than the prospect of ‘random and frag-
mentary enforcement’ of the employer’s legal obligation to pay 
overtime.’”3 Yet under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA),4 which sets the minimum wage and requires overtime 
pay nationwide, no employee can be party to a claim in either 
federal or state court “unless he gives his consent in writing to 
become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in 
 
†  Craig Becker is Associate General Counsel for the AFL-CIO and the 
Service Employees International Union. Paul Strauss is General Counsel for 
ACORN Housing Chicago. The authors would like to thank Cathy Ruckel-
shaus and Jim Reif for reading and commenting on this Article. Copyright © 
2008 by Craig Becker and Paul Strauss. 
 1. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 563–64 (Cal. 2007), cert. de-
nied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3528 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 568. 
 3. Id. at 567 (quoting Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 570 
(Ct. App. 2004)). 
 4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2000). 
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which such action is brought.”5 In other words, under the 
FLSA—enacted to protect “the unprotected, unorganized and 
lowest paid of the nation’s working population”6—employees 
cannot bring class actions.  
Litigants stating virtually every other type of claim in fed-
eral court can do so on behalf of a class so long as the standards 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are satisfied. Sharehold-
ers can bring a derivative action against corporate officers,7 
consumers can bring a fraud case,8 and employees can pursue 
most claims of discrimination and seek to remedy almost all 
other legal grievances against their employers through class 
actions.9 But employees who are not paid the minimum wage or 
mandated overtime compensation cannot. Professors Wright 
and Miller in their treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure 
observe that “[c]ollective actions under the [FLSA] are a unique 
species of group litigation.”10 
Numerous investigations have documented shocking rates 
of noncompliance with the minimum standards established in 
the FLSA, particularly in low-wage industries such as the jani-
torial, food service, garment, and hospitality industries.11 Sev-
eral studies trace noncompliance to the inadequate and shrink-
ing resources devoted to public enforcement.12 But few have 
pointed to the critical difference in the procedural rules govern-
ing workers’ private enforcement of their rights under the 
FLSA and those applicable to virtually all other litigants in 
 
 5. Id. § 216(b). 
 6. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945). 
 7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (governing derivative actions). 
 8. See, e.g., Mooney v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 244 F.R.D. 531, 
531 (D. Minn. 2007). 
 9. The only exceptions are claims under the Equal Pay Act, which was 
incorporated into the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA), which adopts the FLSA’s remedial provi-
sions. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).  
 10. 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1807 (2005). 
 11. See, e.g., NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, HOLDING THE WAGE 
FLOOR: ENFORCEMENT OF WAGE AND HOUR STANDARDS FOR LOW-WAGE 
WORKERS IN AN ERA OF GOVERNMENT INACTION AND EMPLOYER UNACCOUN-
TABILITY 4–7 (2006), available at http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/ 
Holding%20the%20Wage%20Floor2.pdf. 
 12. One study estimates that the annual probability of a Department of 
Labor inspection of one of the seven million workplaces covered by the FLSA is 
well below 0.1%. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Com-
plaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Underenforcement in the U.S 
Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 62 (2005). 
BECKERSTRAUSS_4FMT 5/24/2008 11:36 AM 
2008] MINIMUM LABOR STANDARDS 1319 
 
federal and state court. When the FLSA was amended in 1947 
to require individual, written consent in order to benefit from a 
private enforcement action, Senator Forrest Donnell, the Re-
publican floor leader, proclaimed, “Certainly there is no injus-
tice in that, for if a man wants to join in the suit, why should he 
not give his consent, in writing.”13 It is the thesis of this Article, 
however, that such a requirement, imposed on workers whose 
employer has failed to respect the nation’s minimum labor 
standards, is not only unjust, but unwise public policy and, as 
implemented by the courts, incoherent. 
Part I of this Article traces the origins of the unintended 
divergence of the rules governing FLSA actions and almost all 
other actions in the federal courts caused by the 1947 amend-
ments of the FLSA and the subsequent revision of Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Parts II and III outline 
the unique jurisprudence of representative actions under the 
FLSA. Finally, Part IV details the various ways in which the 
distinctive rules governing FLSA action cripple enforcement of 
the Act. This Article concludes that Congress should remove 
the opt-in requirement imposed by section 16(b) in order to 
harmonize FLSA enforcement and enforcement of virtually all 
other laws.  
I.  THE HISTORY OF FLSA SECTION 16(B)   
Section 16(b) of the FLSA creates a private right of action 
in federal or state court to enforce the Act’s provisions.14 It pro-
vides that the action “may be maintained . . . by any one or 
more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and 
other employees similarly situated.”15 It also provides, however, 
that “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action 
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party 
and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is 
brought.”16 As noted above, it is the last provision that the 
courts have construed to preclude certification of a plaintiff 
class under Rule 23 for the purpose of pursing an FLSA claim.17 
 
 13. 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947) (statement of Senator Donnell); see also 
Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal 
Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 151, 173 (1991) (discussing Senator Donnell’s 
comments during debate over the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947). 
 14. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., LaChapelle v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
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The requirement of individual, written consent to join an 
FLSA action was inserted into the FLSA by the Portal-to-Portal 
Act of 1947.18 Prior to those amendments, the FLSA contained 
what appears on its face to be an extraordinary enforcement 
provision, stating that a private cause of action could be main-
tained “by any one or more employees for and in behalf of him-
self or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or 
such employee or employees may designate an agent or repre-
sentative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all em-
ployees similarly situated.”19 A union, for instance, could be 
designated to bring an FLSA action on behalf of its members, 
or even on behalf of the employees of an unorganized compa-
ny.20 It was recognized at the time that “[i]nsofar as these pro-
visions make possible the adjudication of numerous employee 
claims in a single proceeding, they are highly important devic-
es.”21  
The original FLSA’s private enforcement mechanisms ap-
pear even more extraordinary given the limited provision for 
class actions in the federal courts at the time. Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23, as it existed in 1938, provided only for what 
was dubbed a “spurious class action” when numerous em-
ployees asserted parallel wage claims and in other cases in 
which numerous plaintiffs asserted claims raising “a common 
question of law or fact affecting the several rights” and seeking 
“common relief.”22 In a spurious class action, only individuals 
who affirmatively joined the action could benefit from its out-
come. Professor Moore characterized this form of “class action” 
as nothing more than a “permissive joinder device.”23 
 
 18. Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 251). The major thrust of the Portal-to-Portal Act was to limit FLSA actions 
brought by employees, such as miners, seeking compensation for time spent 
traveling to and from the primary work site. See Linder, supra note 13, at 73–
75. The Act became law on May 14, 1947, just over a month before the same 
Congress overrode President Truman’s veto of the Taft-Hartley Act. The Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) declared at the time, “In the field of 
wage legislation, the Portal-to-Portal Act is as severe a blow to workers’ rights 
as the Taft Hartley Act is in the field of industrial relations.” Id. at 176 (quot-
ing FINAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE 
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 92 (1947)). 
 19. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). 
 20. See Linder, supra note 13, at 98 & nn.236–37. 
 21. James A. Rahl, The Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, 37 U. ILL. L. REV. 119, 122 (1942). 
 22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (1938), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 94–95 (1966). 
 23. 2 JAMES W. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2241 
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Despite the expansive language of the original section 
16(b), however, almost all courts construed it to be consistent 
with the restrictive terms of the then-existing Rule 23.24 Pro-
fessor Marc Linder concludes, “even before the 1947 amend-
ments, the courts limited participation in FLSA actions to 
named plaintiffs, intervenors, and consenters who joined the 
action before the trial on the merits.”25 Thus, Linder heads his 
discussion of the 1947 revision of section 16(b), “The Elimina-
tion of the Class Action That Never Was.”26  
The revision of section 16(b) wrought by the Portal-to-
Portal Act eliminated the provision permitting employees to 
designate an agent or representative to sue for them and also 
made clear that, even in an action brought by an aggrieved em-
ployee on “behalf of . . . other employees similarly situated,” 
each employee must affirmatively opt into the case in order to 
benefit from its outcome.27 The Supreme Court has explained: 
“In part responding to excessive litigation spawned by plaintiffs 
lacking a personal interest in the outcome, the representative 
action by plaintiffs not themselves possessing claims was ab-
olished, and the requirement that an employee file a written 
consent was added.”28 
The amended section 16(b) remained in place when Rule 23 
was revised in 1966 to provide for true class actions in relation 
to almost all other kinds of claims filed in federal court. The 
drafters of the 1966 amendment liberalizing Rule 23 specifical-
ly stated that “[t]he present provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) are 
not intended to be affected by Rule 23, as amended.”29 Subse-
 
(1938).  
 24. See Linder, supra note 13, at 167–72 & nn.665–85. 
 25. Id. at 169; see also G.W. Foster, Jr., Jurisdiction, Rights, and Reme-
dies for Group Wrongs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Special Federal 
Questions, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 295, 324 (“Almost complete agreement was 
reached among the courts that proceedings under Section 16(b) should bind 
only those employees who in some fashion manifested their consent to become 
involved in the action.”).  
 26. Linder, supra note 13, at 167. 
 27. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000). 
 28. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989). In the 
eyes of the Ninety-third Congress, it was primarily unions that were spawning 
this “excessive litigation.” See Linder, supra note 13, at 172. It is unclear, 
however, why Congress imposed the requirement of written consent when the 
courts had already consistently construed the existing provision to require it 
in actions brought by designated agents, like unions, and representative em-
ployees.  
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 
69, 104 (1966). 
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quently, the courts have held that “Rule 23 cannot be invoked 
to circumvent the consent requirement of the third sentence of 
FLSA § 16(b).”30 
The Portal-to-Portal Act’s amendment of section 16(b) thus 
had little impact when it was adopted in 1947,31 but its contin-
ued existence after 1966, when the law of group litigation was 
dramatically altered by the revision of Rule 23, has led to a 
significant divergence between the procedural rights of workers 
under the FLSA and those of virtually all other litigants. After 
1966 and at present, plaintiffs can file a class action suit in fed-
eral or state court under appropriate circumstances to pursue 
almost all federal and state claims over which the court has ju-
risdiction and, if the court certifies the class, all similarly si-
tuated individuals who do not opt out will benefit from a favor-
able outcome. Under section 16(b), in contrast, employees 
seeking to enforce their rights under the FLSA must affirma-
tively opt into a pending action. In the words of the Fifth Cir-
cuit, this is a “fundamental, irreconcilable difference.”32  
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN  
HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE   
Section 16(b) does not provide for any form of certification 
procedure parallel to Rule 23(c). It was not until Hoffmann-La 
Roche Inc. v. Sperling,33 when the Supreme Court resolved a 
split among the circuits concerning the role of the courts in su-
pervising provision of notice under section 16(b), that the fed-
eral courts uniformly began to develop a formal process for de-
termining whether FLSA cases could proceed as representative 
actions and for approving notice to be sent to potential opt-in 
plaintiffs. The ruling came in response to plaintiffs’ motion to 
compel production of the names and addresses of similarly si-
tuated employees and for the court to send such employees no-
tice of the action.34 The Court did not mandate or even approve 
a certification-type procedure, but held only “that district 
courts have discretion in appropriate cases, to implement 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b) . . . by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs” 
 
 30. LaChapelle v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 31. Section 16(b) did, however, preclude enforcement of the FLSA by labor 
unions with individual employees’ written consent. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 32. LaChapelle, 513 F.2d at 288. 
 33. 493 U.S. 165 (1989). The case actually arose under the ADEA, which 
incorporates section 16 of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).  
 34. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 168 (1989). 
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and that “[t]he District Court was correct to permit discovery of 
the names and addresses of the” similarly situated employees 
for that purpose.35 The Court’s reasoning echoed the rationale 
for class actions: “A collective action allows . . . plaintiffs the 
advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the 
pooling of resources. The judicial system benefits by efficient 
resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact 
arising from the same [operative facts].”36 From this founda-
tion, the Court concluded that “[t]hese benefits, however, de-
pend on employees receiving accurate and timely notice con-
cerning the pendency of the collective action, so that they can 
make informed decisions about whether to participate.”37 Judi-
cial oversight was therefore appropriate, the Court held, both 
to prevent “misleading communications” via “court-authorized 
notice”38 and “to manage the process of joining multiple parties 
in a manner that is orderly, sensible, and not otherwise con-
trary to statutory commands or the [federal Rules].”39 
III.  THE DEVELOPING JURISPRUDENCE OF  
SECTION 16(B)   
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffmann-La Roche, 
the lower federal courts have developed an increasingly elabo-
rate process for what they often term “certifying” and “decerti-
fying” section 16(b) actions.40 As we explain in Part IV, howev-
er, clearing the hurdles courts have placed in the way of 
workers seeking to collectively enforce their rights under sec-
tion 16(b) does not lead to the same benefits as certification of a 
class under Rule 23. 
Even before Hoffmann-La Roche, federal courts recognized 
that section 16(b) “authorizes a representative action.”41 Hoff-
mann-La Roche further authorized trial courts to facilitate par-
 
 35. Id. at 169–70.  
 36. Id. at 170. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 171. 
 39. Id. at 170. In other words, a trial court “has a managerial responsibili-
ty to oversee the joinder of additional parties to assure that the task is accom-
plished in an efficient and proper way.” Id. at 170–71. 
 40. See, e.g., Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102–03 
(10th Cir. 2001) (describing the review of defendant’s “motion to decertify”); 
Goldman v. Radioshack Corp., No. Civ. A. 2:03-CV-0032, 2003 WL 21250571, 
at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2003) (holding that the court would “conditionally cer-
tify the FLSA representative action”). 
 41. Woods v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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ticipation in such a representative action by supervising provi-
sion of notice by the original named employee-plaintiffs and by 
ensuring a fair and expedited process for similarly situated 
employees to join an FLSA action.42 Because section 16(b) does 
not set forth a certification procedure similar to Rule 23, estab-
lish standards for when an action should proceed as a repre-
sentative action (beyond the terse phrase “on behalf of . . . other 
employees similarly situated”), or specify when notice should be 
sent, the courts have developed a set of procedures and stan-
dards on a case-by-case basis.43  
A two-stage process for determining whether FLSA actions 
will proceed as representative actions is now recognized as “the 
prevailing federal standard.”44 Under this approach, at the first 
stage, plaintiffs move to provide court-approved notice to simi-
larly situated employees informing them of their right to opt in-
to the action.45 The motion to give notice ordinarily is made 
early in the litigation before the completion of discovery.46 The 
second stage takes place at or near the close of discovery when 
the defendant has an opportunity to move to “decertify” the 
representative action.47 As the Eleventh Circuit has observed, 
“The second determination is typically precipitated by a motion 
for decertification by the defendant usually filed after discovery 
is largely complete.”48 
 
 42. Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 171–72. 
 43. See Scott E. Cole & Matthew R. Bainer, To Certify or Not to Certify: A 
Circuit-by-Circuit Primer on the Varying Standards for Class Certification in 
Actions Under the Federal Labor Standards Act, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 167, 
170–72 (2004). 
 44. Butler v. San Antonio, No. SA-03-CA-170-RF, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15805, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2003). This approach is usually attributed to 
the District of New Jersey’s 1987 decision in Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 
F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit, while calling such an ap-
proach “an effective tool for district courts to use in managing these often 
complex cases” and “suggest[ing] that district courts in this circuit adopt it in 
future cases,” held that nothing in circuit precedent “requires district courts to 
utilize this approach.” Hipp v. Liberty National Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 
1219 (11th Cir. 2001). The Tenth Circuit suggested that the two-stage “ad hoc 
approach” is “[a]rguably . . . the best,” but did not hold that it was mandatory, 
stating simply that a district court did not abuse it discretion in adopting the 
approach. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1105.  
 45. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1103. 
 46. See, e.g., Jackson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D. 429, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 47. Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 
1207, 1213–14 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 48. Id. The Tenth Circuit similarly observes, “At the conclusion of discov-
ery (often prompted by a motion to decertify), the court then makes a second 
determination.” Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102–03.  
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The effect of “decertification” is unclear. Several courts 
have suggested that, upon decertification, the court should 
dismiss the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice.49 
Yet these individuals will have affirmatively opted in, becoming 
“party plaintiffs.” In some jurisdictions, plaintiffs’ counsel is re-
quired to amend the complaint to add all these individuals as 
plaintiffs and state claims on their behalf.50 In some cases, 
some or all of the opt-ins will have responded to written discov-
ery.51 It is not clear why decertification should result in dismis-
sal of such opt-ins’ claims as opposed to severance. 
The federal courts have considered three possible sources 
of substantive standards to apply under section 16(b). Under 
the first approach, “a court determines, on an ad hoc case-by-
case basis, whether plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated.’”52 This 
approach is linked to the now dominant two-stage process de-
scribed above.53 Under the second approach, courts use the 
standards established in Rule 23 to determine whether em-
ployees are “similarly situated.”54 Under the third approach, 
courts incorporate the pre-1966 standards used under Rule 23 
for spurious class actions.55 The two-step process applying the 
“ad hoc” standard is now virtually uniformly accepted.  
IV.  THE IMPACT OF SECTION 16(B) ON ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE FLSA   
In several critical respects, section 16(b) makes it less like-
ly that employees will enforce their rights under the FLSA, re-
duces the damages employees are likely to recover from em-
ployers, and makes litigation of FLSA claims on behalf of 
employees more difficult.  
A. FEWER PLAINTIFFS 
The most obvious result of section 16(b)’s preclusion of an 
ordinary class action is a lower participation rate in most FLSA 
lawsuits. As the Third Circuit recognized, “Under most cir-
cumstances, the opt-out class will be greater in number, per-
 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 1218. 
 50. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 51. See infra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. 
 52. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. Shushan v. University of Colorado, 132 F.R.D. 263 (D. Colo. 1990), 
is often cited for using this approach. 
 55. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1103. 
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haps even exponentially greater” than the section 16(b) opt-in 
class.56 
One reason for lack of participation is that many similarly 
situated employees never receive the typically mailed notice. 
Because of high turnover in low-wage jobs and frequent 
changes of address among low-wage workers, the mailing list 
provided by employers for purpose of sending the notice will or-
dinarily contain many addresses that are no longer accurate. In 
the janitorial industry, for example, where wage and hour vi-
olations are notorious, the turnover rate is approximately 250% 
annually, and the average tenure of a janitor is less than five 
months.57 For this reason, even if the employer maintains accu-
rate addresses for current employees,58 the last-known address 
for many potential plaintiffs (who may have left employment as 
long as three years prior to the mailing of notice)59 will not 
have been updated for a long period before the addresses are 
provided to the plaintiffs. This is important because low-wage, 
unskilled workers like janitors are also highly mobile. The Cen-
sus Bureau confirms that the rate of relocation is highest 
among people with the lowest income (twenty-eight percent of 
households with income below the poverty level move during a 
single year).60 Hispanics, who occupy many low-wage jobs, have 
the highest rate of movement of any ethnic group.61  
The result of high turnover and mobility is obvious: re-
turned notices. In one recent case we were involved in, over 
half of the almost three thousand notices that were sent to jani-
tors who worked in Illinois and Texas were returned, marked 
 
 56. De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 310 (3d Cir. 2003). In 
Thiebes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 145 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 34,442, at 53,887 (D. 
Or. Jan. 9, 2002), for example, only 425 of the 15,507 similarly situated em-
ployees (2.7%) opted in. Id. at 53,859. 
 57. See Repps Hudson, 7 Cleaning Firms Accept Union’s Model Contract, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 26, 2002, at C1; High Cost of Turnover, 
CLEANING MAINTENANCE & MGMT. MAG. ONLINE, Sept. 2003, http://www 
.cmmonline.com/article.asp?IndexID=6633938 (follow “High Cost of Turnover” 
sidebar hyperlink) (“[T]urnover of 200–300 percent is typical of the industry.”).  
 58. An employer is required to do so under the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 516.2(a)(2) (2007).  
 59. A three-year statute of limitations applies to willful violations of the 
FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2000).  
 60. JASON SCHACHTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBL’N NO. P20-538, GEO-
GRAPHICAL MOBILITY: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS MARCH 1999 TO MARCH 
2000, at 4–5 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/ 
p20-538.pdf. 
 61. See id. at 4 tbl.B. 
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undeliverable.62 In a few cases, such as ours, courts have ap-
proved additional forms of notice, such as short-form notices 
broadcast on the radio, published in newspapers, or posted in 
gathering spots in neighborhoods where employees are likely to 
live.63 But these forms of notice are expensive, particularly in 
urban markets, and produce a very low yield of opt-ins given 
the difficulty of precise targeting.64 
Second, even if the court-approved notice arrives in the 
correct mail box, its message is unlikely to be received in the 
manner most judges and lawyers expect. Many people who find 
such a notice in their mail will throw it away.65 It is an unsoli-
cited piece of mail involving a legal proceeding. If recipients 
read the notice, they are likely to find the language confusing, 
intimidating, or threatening.66 The notice goes to working-class 
people (executives, administrators, and professionals are not 
covered by the FLSA).67 They are unlikely to be familiar with 
legal terms; they may not read well; many may be immigrants 
who have limited facility in English.68 For any person, words 
like “judgment,” “attorneys’ fees,” “damages,” and “liable” have 
troubling connotations. And no matter what the notice says, 
people who receive it are likely to think that responding could 
 
 62. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion to Extend Opt-in Period 
and Supplement Mail Notice at 1, Docket No. 167, Vega v. Contract Cleaning 
Maint., Inc., No. 03-C-9130, 2006 WL 1554383 (N.D. Ill. 2006). At the time we 
filed this motion, we reported to the court that 1108 out of 2664 notices had 
been returned. See id. However, a significant number of notices were returned 
as undeliverable after the motion was filed. See also De Asencio v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that nearly 800 of 3400 
notices “were ‘undeliverable’ and ‘returned to sender’”); Thiebes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 145 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 34,442, at 53,858 (D. Or. Jan. 9, 2002) (not-
ing that approximately 3000 of 15,507 notices were returned). 
 63. See, e.g., Lima v. Int’l Catastrophe Solutions, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 
793, 801 (E.D. La. 2007) (allowing the use of consulates, Spanish and Portu-
guese newspapers, radio, and the Internet to provide notice to opt-in in an 
FLSA action); Marroquin v. Canales, 236 F.R.D. 257, 261–62 & n.19 (D. Md. 
2006); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion to Extend Opt-in Period 
and Supplement Mail Notice, Docket No. 167, and Minute Entry granting Mo-
tion, Docket No. 173, Vega, No. 03-C-9130 (N.D. Ill.). 
 64. See Scott S. Partridge & Kerry J. Miller, Some Practical Considera-
tions for Defending and Settling Products Liability and Consumer Class Ac-
tions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 2125, 2141 (2000). 
 65. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law 
in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 
17 (1986). 
 66. See id. at 22. 
 67. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2000). 
 68. See, e.g., SCHACHTER, supra note 60, at 4 tbl.B. 
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lead to trouble.69 There could be hidden terms that are not de-
scribed in the notice; it could be a scam; money will have to be 
paid at some point, recipients are likely to think—no one gets 
anything for free. Moreover, sensible people do not sign legal 
documents they have not requested and send them to a court or 
lawyers they do not know and with whom they have never spo-
ken. 
Finally, even potential plaintiffs who receive, read, and 
understand the notice are unlikely to mail back the opt-in 
form.70 Such people will recognize what they are being asked to 
do: they are being solicited to join a lawsuit against their em-
ployer.71 One does not have to be a legal scholar to know that 
suing the boss is not a safe career move. Joining the case, an 
employee might reasonably fear, will result in retaliation. It 
could mean being assigned to the dirtiest job on the worst shift, 
or it could mean being fired.72 Even if the notice says, as it 
should, that retaliation is prohibited by the FLSA,73 businesses 
do not always follow the law. If they did, there would not have 
been a need for the lawsuit in the first place.  
This factor dovetails with the first (the difficulty of track-
ing down potential opt-in plaintiffs) because the employer is 
most likely to have accurate addresses for its current em-
ployees and current employees are the least likely group to opt 
into a lawsuit against their employer. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that “it needs no argument to show that fear of eco-
nomic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved em-
ployees quietly to accept substandard conditions.”74 And the 
California high court further explained that “[t]he difficulty of 
suing a current employer is likely greater for employees further 
down on the corporate hierarchy,” like those protected by the 
FLSA.75 The notice and opt-in process is, in fact, no different 
than employer polling of employees concerning their union sen-
timents. The federal courts and National Labor Relations 
 
 69. See Miller & Crump, supra note 65, at 17. 
 70. See Noah A. Finkel, State Wage-and-Hour Law Class Actions: The 
Real Wave of “FLSA” Litigation?, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 159, 159 (2003). 
 71. See id. 
 72. Courts have repeatedly recognized “that retaining one’s employment 
while bringing formal legal action against one’s employer is not ‘a viable op-
tion for many employees.’” Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 565 (Cal. 
2007) (quoting Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 29 P.3d 175 (Cal. 2007)). 
 73. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000). 
 74. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). 
 75. Gentry, 165 P.3d at 565. 
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Board have uniformly held such polling to be unlawful “because 
of its natural tendency to instill in the minds of employees fear 
of discrimination on the basis of the information the employer 
has obtained.”76 In the case of section 16(b), the information the 
employer obtains is not which employees support the union but 
rather which employees have affirmatively chosen to sue the 
employer. While one district court observed that “plaintiff-
employees who proceed collectively [under section 16(b)] can 
present a united front against an employer, and head off indi-
vidualized retaliation,”77 in fact, only a Rule 23 class-action 
would truly permit employees to present such a “united front.” 
Indeed, many federal courts have recognized fear of retaliation 
as a factor supporting a finding that joinder is impracticable 
and thus that class certification is warranted in employment 
litigation.78 Yet under section 16(b), each employee must sign 
on the dotted line with the specter of workplace reprisal in the 
back of his or her mind.  
The Supreme Court has described the result of an opt-in 
requirement in terms that are especially apt as applied to the 
FLSA’s section 16(b): “freezing out the claims of people—
especially small claims held by small people—who for one rea-
son or another, ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with business 
or legal matters, will simply not take the affirmative step.”79 
Thus, while the same Court declared in ringing tones that 
“FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise 
waived,”80 in practice, waiver is an endemic aspect of the sec-
tion 16(b) process. 
 
 76. NLRB v. W. Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902, 904 (9th Cir. 1953). The 
Supreme Court has recognized that anonymity is an important element of the 
right to freely associate. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).  
 77. Bonilla v. Las Vegas Cigar Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139 (D. Nev. 
1999).  
 78. For example, the Fifth Circuit cited the fact that employees were “un-
willing to sue individually or join a suit for fear of retaliation.” Mullen v. Trea-
sure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Horn v. 
Assoc. Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 275 (10th Cir. 1977); Ark. Educ. 
Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Portland, Ark., 446 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1971); Scott 
v. Aetna Servs. Inc., 210 F.R.D. 261, 267 (D. Conn. 2002); Gentry, 165 P.3d at 
565. 
 79. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813 n.4 (1985) (quoting 
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98 
(1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981). 
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B. LOWER DAMAGE AWARDS 
Not only are fewer employees likely to participate in an ac-
tion brought under section 16(b) then in an ordinary class ac-
tion, they are likely to receive lower damages awards for two 
reasons. First, the same tolling rules do not apply under section 
16(b) as under Rule 23. In a class action brought under Rule 23, 
the filing of the complaint tolls the running of the statute of li-
mitations for all members of the proposed class.81 The same 
rule does not apply to actions brought under section 16(b), how-
ever. This is because at the same time that the requirement of 
individual written consent was added to the FLSA by the Por-
tal-to-Portal Act, Congress provided that the statute of limita-
tions for claims under the FLSA would not be stayed for any 
employee until he or she filed such written consent with the 
court.82 Because of the time needed to file a motion to give no-
tice, which may be preceded by motions to dismiss and some 
minimal discovery, and to brief the motion, obtain a ruling, 
mail notice, and file consent forms, the absence of a stay of the 
limitations period from the time a representative action is filed 
until consent forms are filed often significantly reduces the 
back pay ultimately awarded to opt-in plaintiffs. Some em-
ployees may have their right to recovery entirely eliminated be-
cause they do not get the notice and file a consent form in time 
to meet the limitations deadline. 
A defendant that has violated the FLSA over a course of 
years can thus reduce its damage exposure if it can delay the 
opt-in process—every day that passes before consents are filed 
is a day less of potential liability. Accordingly, defendants 
commonly take steps to delay the notice process. In our expe-
rience, defendants will not concede that they have to produce 
names and addresses of similarly situated employees so that 
notice can be mailed. Instead, they will force plaintiffs to take 
time negotiating for the discovery.83 Those negotiations will go 
nowhere and plaintiffs will have to file and brief a motion to 
compel and wait for a court decision before they can get what 
they need to mail a notice. When ordered to produce names and 
addresses, defendants will take their time before actually pro-
 
 81. See Crown, Cork & Seal, Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–54 (1983); 
Am. Pipe Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 561 (1974). 
 82. See 29 U.S.C. § 256 (2000). 
 83. See Laura L. Ho, Collective Action Basics, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 
J. 427, 432 (2006). 
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viding them.84 Defendants will haggle over minor provisions of 
the proposed notice, forcing a round of briefing, and additional 
delay, before the court approves a notice. During this time, the 
limitations period will continue to run. 
Despite the fact that the statute of limitations on potential 
opt-in plaintiffs’ claims continues to run until they receive no-
tice and actually opt in, the denial of a motion to proceed as a 
representative action and thus give notice is not immediately 
appealable. The Ninth Circuit recently so held in McElmurry v. 
U.S. Bank National Ass’n.85 The court observed that its holding 
was consistent with that of other circuits that had addressed 
the application of the collateral order rule to rulings under sec-
tion 16(b)86 as well as with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,87 holding that denial of class 
certification is not immediately appealable. The Livesay deci-
sion, however, has been largely nullified by the amendment of 
Rule 23.88 In McElmurry, the plaintiffs argued “that the statute 
of limitations will continue to run, and that some employees 
may lose their opportunity to participate in a collective action if 
they wait until after an appeal from final judgment.”89 “[W]e 
understand [plaintiffs’] concern,” the court stated, but never-
theless held the refusal to approve notice unappealable until 
after a final judgment.90 
The second reason why damages in a representative action 
under section 16(b) are typically lower than in a Rule 23 class 
action is that in the latter the court can award damages based 
on the injury inflicted on the entire class whether or not all of 
its members have appeared and presented claims. Of course, 
class counsel may not be able to locate all class members post-
judgment, just as plaintiffs’ counsel often cannot locate all po-
 
 84. However, some courts have taken action to deprive defendants of the 
benefit of their delay using the doctrine of equitable tolling. For example, 
courts may toll the statute of limitations during the period when a defendant 
should have produced the list but did not. See, e.g., Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. 
Sys., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 530, 543 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 85. 495 F.3d 1136, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 86. See Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that an order permitting notice is not appealable); Baldridge v. SBC 
Commc’ns, Inc., 404 F.3d 930, 931 (5th Cir. 2005); Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 
F.2d 1062, 1065 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a decertification order was not 
appealable); Lusardi v. Xerox, 747 F.2d 174, 177–78 (3d Cir. 1984) (same). 
 87. 437 U.S. 463 (1978). 
 88. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f ). 
 89. McElmurry, 495 F.3d at 1141. 
 90. Id. 
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tential opt-in plaintiffs at the notice stage of a section 16(b) ac-
tion. But in a class action, the court can still assess full, class-
wide damages and permit payment of amounts attributable to 
unlocatable class members to an appropriate, alternative reci-
pient. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, “Federal courts have 
broad discretionary powers in shaping equitable decrees for 
distributing unclaimed class action funds.”91  
 The cy pres doctrine recognizes that it is inconsistent 
with public policy to permit a defendant to retain ill-gotten gain 
when all the victims of the defendant’s wrong cannot be located 
because to do so would undermine the deterrence function of 
damage awards. The Seventh Circuit has held that “[t]hose 
cases where a corporate defendant engages in unlawful conduct 
and illegally profits [are] most appropriate for” this form of 
equitable redistribution of class-wide damages.92 Absent section 
16(b), FLSA cases would appear to fall squarely within that 
category of cases. As Judge Posner observed, “the reason for 
appealing to cy pres is to prevent the defendant from walking 
away from the litigation scot-free because of the infeasibility of 
distributing the proceeds of the settlement (or the judg-
ment[)].”93 Under the FLSA, however, this is often exactly what 
happens because of the operation of section 16(b). 
These two factors combine with the facts that the FLSA 
does not provide for any form of compensatory damages other 
than back pay94 or for punitive damages; that the FLSA has a 
relatively short statute of limitations (two or, for willful viola-
tion, three years); and that shaving payroll costs by not paying 
employees the minimum wage or overtime compensation may 
impose significant harm on individual workers but often does 
not add up to a large sum of money for the employer. The result 
is that damage awards in FLSA actions, particularly those 
brought on behalf of low-wage workers, do not represent a sig-
nificant deterrent to violating the law. Employers concerned 
only with profits, particularly in highly competitive, labor-
intensive sectors of the economy, may rationally conclude that 
it pays to violate the FLSA.  
 
 91. Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1307 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
 92. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 677 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 93. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Co., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 94. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000). Plaintiffs are also typically awarded an 
additional amount equal to one hundred percent of their back pay as liqui-
dated damages to compensate them for the delay in payment. Id. 
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C. GREATER RISKS AND GREATER BURDENS FOR COUNSEL 
Low opt-in rates combine with low damage awards to 
create higher risks for plaintiffs’ counsel in the recovery of at-
torney’s fees, despite the existence of a fee-shifting provision in 
the FLSA.95 At the same time, the opt-in requirement tempts 
many defendants to seek to impose enormous burdens on plain-
tiffs’ counsel during discovery.  
Statutory fee shifting provisions, like that in the FLSA, 
have been construed to provide that a prevailing plaintiff may 
recover reasonably incurred fees, even if the fees are more than 
the amount of damages recovered.96 But it is hard to find a law-
yer who will take an individual’s case where the damages are 
five hundred dollars, even when a fee-shifting statute applies. 
The simplest statutory case, if carried through trial, is likely to 
require at least ten thousand dollars worth of attorney time 
and in most cases the fees and costs incurred will be much 
higher. The prospect of asking a court to award tens of thou-
sands of dollars in fees for recovery of five hundred dollars in 
damages is not attractive. The risks are too high that a trial 
court will find that some of the time was not reasonably spent, 
and cut fees accordingly, despite the established principle ex-
plained above. 
In addition, the lawyer who takes a small case in anticipa-
tion of collecting fees from the defendant pursuant to a fee 
shifting provision (because the plaintiff cannot pay the lawyer 
on an hourly basis), will be put in an untenable position when 
it is time to talk about settlement. Imagine, for example, a case 
with $500 in damages at stake and fees of $8000 already in-
curred. Suppose a defendant offers to pay four thousand dollars 
to settle the case. That is more than enough money to provide 
the client with complete recovery of all his or her damages. Is 
the lawyer in that situation going to demand that the case be 
tried (assuming the lawyer has a retainer agreement that per-
 
 95. See id. 
 96. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 n.11 (1986) (“[Defen-
dants] cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the 
time necessarily spent by plaintiff in response.”). For a thorough discussion of 
the issues, see United Automobile Workers Local 259 Social Security Depart-
ment v. Metro Auto Center, 501 F.3d 283, 292–96 (3d Cir. 2007), and cases 
cited therein. The same rule ostensibly applies under the FLSA. See, e.g., Cho 
v. Koam Med. Servs. P.C., No. 1:05-CV-05265 (ENV) (RML), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 88697, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2007) (“[W]here, as here, the plaintiffs 
were successful on all their claims, the full lodestar amount will not be re-
duced ‘simply because a plaintiff recovered a low damage award.’”).  
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mits the lawyer to make that decision), contrary to the inter-
ests of the client? With a small claim for damages, even under a 
fee-shifting statute, a lawyer in settlement discussions is likely 
to have to choose between taking the case to trial, contrary to 
the client’s best interests, or settling the case and being paid 
for only a fraction of the time spent.97 From the lawyer’s point 
of view, it is better to avoid small-damages cases and not to be 
placed in that position. 
Not only do lawyers handling FLSA actions face greater 
risks as a result of smaller damage awards largely as a result 
of the opt-in requirement, they must also often fend off efforts 
by employers to impose extraordinary burdens in discovery 
based on the same peculiar requirement. This is because em-
ployees who opt into an FLSA representative action are in an 
anomalous position under the discovery rules. They are not one 
of the original named plaintiffs who brought the lawsuit. But 
they are also not unnamed class members. They are something 
in between—in the words of section 16(b) they are “party plain-
tiff[s].”98 This hybrid status often leads to major discovery dis-
putes in FLSA litigation. 
The amount of discovery that can be required from absent 
class members under Rule 23 is clearly limited.99 A defendant 
is entitled to the full range of discovery only from the named 
plaintiffs.100 It is entitled to full discovery concerning the na-
ture of the class’ claims and damages.101 And a defendant is en-
titled to discovery about class members who are likely to be 
called as witnesses at trial.102 But each member of the class is 
not a “party” with the corresponding obligation to answer inter-
 
 97. If the settlement offer is rejected and the results at trial are not good, 
there is high risk that fees will be slashed and the attorney will not be paid for 
a large portion of his or her time. See, e.g., Sheffer v. Experian Information So-
lutions, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Keeton v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660–61 (E.D. Tex. 1998).  
 98. Id. 
 99. Cornn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. C03-2001 THE, 2006 WL 
2642540, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2006); McCarthy v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., 164 
F.R.D. 309, 313 (D. Conn. 1995); see also Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 810; 
Collins v. Int’l Dairy Queen, 190 F.R.D. 629, 630–31 (M.D. Ga. 1999); Long v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 100. See, e.g., In re Scimed Life Sec. Litig., [1992–1993 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,220 (Nov. 20, 1992); In re Folding Carton Anti-
trust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 260, 264 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
 101. See Ho, supra note 83, at 432–33. 
 102. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 65,776 (Dec. 16, 1983); see also Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977). 
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rogatories, produce documents, respond to requests for admis-
sions, and appear at a deposition pursuant to a mere notice un-
der Rules 30, 33, 34, and 36. As the Supreme Court has 
plained, “an absent class action plaintiff is not required to do 
anything.”103 Nor can a defendant ordinarily take the deposi-
tions of all class members, even if it serves them with a sub-
poena as third parties.104 These rules save the class and its 
lawyer from being overwhelmed with the burden of answering 
discovery requests, person-by-person, for hundreds of class 
members. As one district court observed, “Individualized dis-
covery is thought to thwart the efficiencies of a class action and 
place ‘undue burdens on the absent class members.’”105  
In contrast, defendants often take the position that be-
cause the FLSA designates each person who opts-in as a party 
plaintiff , that means each opt-in is a full party under the dis-
covery rules. One plaintiffs’ lawyer observed that “[s]ome de-
fendants will insist that it is their right to take individualized 
discovery of all opt-in plaintiffs.”106 The defendants’ position is 
bolstered by the law in some courts requiring plaintiffs’ counsel 
to actually amend the complaint to state a claim on behalf of 
each such opt-in before the statute of limitations on their FLSA 
claim is stayed.107 A few courts have accepted this position, 
 
 103. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 810 & n.2.  
 104. See, e.g., On the House Syndication, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 203 
F.R.D. 452, 456–57 (S.D. Cal. 2001); Collins, 190 F.R.D. at 631; Kline v. First 
W. Gov’t, No. Civ. A. 83-1076, 1996 WL 122717, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1996); In re 
Carbon Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 155 F.R.D. 209, 212 (M.D. Fla. 1993); In re 
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 97,018 (July 9, 1992); In re Lucent Techs. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. 00-621JAP, 
2002 WL 32818345, at *1 (D.N.J. May 9, 2002). But see, e.g., Easton & Co. v. 
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., No. 91-4012 (HLS), 92-2095 (HLS), 1994 WL 
248172, at *3–6 (D.N.J. 1994); Transamerican Ref. Corp. v. Dravo Corp., 139 
F.R.D. 619, 621 (S.D. Tex. 1991). 
 105. Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (Se.), Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2000-JEC, 
2007 WL 1500269, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2007) (quoting Collins, 190 F.R.D. 
at 631). 
 106. Ho, supra note 83, at 432.  
 107. For example, this is the law in the Northern District of Illinois. “[T]he 
act of filing a written consent alone does not automatically join an individual 
to the lawsuit. Rather, Section 216(b) operates in conjunction with Rule 8 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and requires the employee to name the 
individual plaintiff and allege his or her cause of action in the complaint . . . .” 
Harkins v. Riverboat Servs., No. 99 C 123, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637, at 
*16–17 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2002). “The filing of a written consent in and of itself 
is insufficient to join this lawsuit. . . . ‘It is ‘necessary’ under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure to plead facts in the complaint regarding the FLSA claims 
asserted by the prospective parties who filed consents.’” Id. at *17. 
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treating a person who opts into a representative action as if he 
were a full party required to respond to the full-range of writ-
ten discovery—interrogatories, requests to produce documents, 
requests to admit—and to appear for a deposition without be-
ing subpoenaed, absent a protective order.108 
If trial courts accept the contention that each opt-in is a 
full party for purposes of discovery, defense counsel can over-
whelm the plaintiffs simply by addressing written discovery to 
each person who has opted in. In a recent case, United Parcel 
Service and other defendants served interrogatories,109 re-
quests for production, and requests for admissions on all the 
approximately 150 original and opt-in plaintiffs. Together, the 
three forms of written discovery sought over 25,000 separate 
responses from the plaintiffs.110 In a section 16(b) action with 
hundreds or thousands of opt-in plaintiffs, this form of indivi-
 
 108. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Royal & Sunalliance USA, Inc., No. C05-1774-
MAT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50912, at *7–8 (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2006) (con-
cluding that “the Court is persuaded by the reasoning of courts permitting in-
dividualized discovery of opt-in plaintiffs,” but also finding that “[p]laintiffs 
fail to adequately support their contention that discovery relating to a total of 
thirty-six individuals would be unduly burdensome”); Coldiron v. Pizza Hut, 
Inc., No. CV03-05865TJHMCX, 2004 WL 2601180, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 
2004) (noting that 306 people who opted into the FLSA case were required to 
respond to individual requests to admit, interrogatories, and document re-
quests); Rosen v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., No. 91 CIV. 1675 (LMM), 1994 WL 
652534, at *3, 12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1994) (describing an ADEA case in which 
fifty people who opted in could be deposed); Adkins v. Mid-Am. Growers, Inc., 
141 F.R.D. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (describing that discovery supervised by a ma-
gistrate judge in an FLSA case included service of written discovery on all opt-
ins and eighty-one depositions of people who opted in); Brooks v. Farm Fresh, 
Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that all 127 people who opted 
into an FLSA case could be deposed), rev’d on other grounds, Shaffer v. Farm 
Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1992); Kaas v. Pratt & Whitney, No. 89-
8343-CIV-PAINE, 1991 WL 158943, at *2, 5 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting that, in 
an ADEA case, approximately one hundred people who opted in were required 
to answer interrogatories, produce documents, and be deposed). Other courts, 
while not treating opt-in plaintiffs as full parties, still treat them differently 
than Rule 23 class members. See Luna, 2007 WL 1500269, at *6–7 (“Plaintiffs 
. . . however, are not absent members of a Rule 23 class action, but opt-in 
plaintiffs under § 216(b) of the FLSA. . . . Having opted into the litigation, 
[plaintiffs] are not ‘passive’ in the same sense as absent Rule 23 class mem-
bers.”). 
 109. The Federal Rules limit the number of interrogatories that can be 
served “on any other party” to twenty-five. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a). Thus, the 
number of interrogatories that can be served turns on whether opt-in plaintiffs 
are “part[ies]” according to the Rule.  
 110. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion for Final Approval of 
Partial Class Action Settlement at 3–4, Docket No. 452, Vega v. Contract 
Cleaning Maint., Inc., No. 03-C-9130, 2006 WL 1554383, (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
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dualized written discovery and depositions can impose an un-
bearable burden on plaintiffs. This is true not simply because of 
the number of responses that must be prepared, but also be-
cause plaintiffs in FLSA action, typically low-wage workers, 
cannot ordinarily independently review the questions and re-
quests and prepare draft responses for their counsel as corpo-
rate defendants can. Rather, a laborious process of interview-
ing, drafting, checking, and revising is required, one that forces 
counsel to repeatedly contact multiple plaintiffs who usually 
cannot talk about such matters at work and often work two and 
even three jobs.  
Recognizing the costs and impracticality of conducting dis-
covery person-by-person in an opt-in case, as well as the fact 
that it is ordinarily not necessary in FLSA actions, most courts 
have, however, exercised their discretion to supervise discovery 
and prevent “undue burden or expense”111 by limiting discovery 
to a representative sample of opt-ins, at least in cases where 
the number of opt-ins is large.112 Courts have authority to regu-
late and control discovery to avoid unwarranted burdens and 
excess.113 At trial in an FLSA case, testimony from a represent-
ative sample of employees is sufficient to establish liability and 
the measure of damages for those similarly situated, i.e. each 
opt-in does not have to testify to be awarded damages.114 If lia-
 
 111. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
 112. See, e.g., Geer v. Challenge Fin. Investors Corp., No. 05-1109-JTM, 
2007 WL 1341774, at *6 (D. Kan. May 4, 2007) (granting a motion for a protec-
tive order quashing notices of depositions of 256 plaintiffs, including 246 opt-
ins); Smith v. Lowes Home Ctrs., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 354, 357–58 (S.D. Ohio 
2006) (demonstrating, in an FLSA case with more than 1500 opt-ins, discovery 
conducted using a statistically significant sample of opt-ins); Morales-Arcadio 
v. Shannon Produce Farms Inc., No. CV605-062, 2006 WL 2578835, at *4 (S.D. 
Ga. Aug. 26, 2006) (denying a motion to compel all forty-five plaintiffs to an-
swer interrogatories and respond to production requests); Bradford v. Bed 
Bath & Beyond, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (permitting 
discovery from 31 of more than 300 opt-in plaintiffs); McGrath v. City of Phil-
adelphia, No. CIV. A. 92-4570, 1994 WL 45162, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 1994) 
(applying the law under Rule 23 by analogy to prevent discovery from over 
4100 opt-in police officers).  
 113. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(A), (C); id. R. 26(c). 
 114. See, e.g., Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“Although the plaintiffs correctly point out that not all employees need testify 
in order to prove FLSA violations or recoup back wages, the plaintiffs must 
provide sufficient evidence for the jury to make a reasonable inference as to 
the number of hours worked by non-testifying employees.”); Reich v. S. New 
Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 66–68 (2d Cir. 1997); Janowski v. Castal-
di, No. 01CV0164(SJF)(KAM), 2006 WL 118973, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 
2006). 
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bility can be determined based on the testimony of representa-
tive employees, most courts see no reason why discovery should 
be permitted from more than a representative group of em-
ployees.  
Yet there is no guarantee that a trial court in an opt-in 
case will limit discovery to a sample of opt-ins. And in each case 
in which the defendant employs the tactic of serving discovery 
on all “party plaintiffs,” plaintiffs will be forced to negotiate 
with defendants over the number of opt-ins who should be sub-
ject to discovery and, often, to move for a protective order. Un-
der Rule 23, in contrast, it is the defendant who must move for 
an exception to the accepted principle that absent class mem-
bers have no obligation to answer written discovery. Further, 
under Rule 23, in order to serve such discovery or take deposi-
tions of absent class members, the defendant bears the “burden 
of showing necessity and absence of any motive to take undue 
advantage of the class members.”115 In some cases, the court 
may require person-by-person discovery, as burdensome as that 
may be. In many cases, the opt-in provisions of the FLSA, as 
opposed to the rules that prevail under Rule 23, will make it 
more time-consuming and expensive—in some cases impracti-
cal—to prosecute a collective action. 
D. DIFFICULTIES IN SETTLEMENT 
Section 16(b)’s anomalous status outside the developed 
Rule 23 jurisprudence also produces unique difficulties in set-
tlement of FLSA representative actions. Under Rule 23, set-
tlement negotiations can be conducted on a class-wide basis, by 
the lawyer and named plaintiffs, without consulting each class 
member, person-by-person, or obtaining each class member’s 
consent before a settlement is reached.116 It would be imprac-
tical, to say the least, to arrive at settlement positions, commu-
nicate a defendant’s responses, formulate counteroffers, and 
engage in the rapid back and forth that is required for effective 
negotiation, if it had to be done for each class member indivi-
dually. Moreover, at the conclusion of the settlement process, 
 
 115. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 341 (7th Cir. 1974). 
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant must carry a greater bur-
den before taking depositions of absent class members under Rule 23 “in light 
of the nature of the deposition process—namely, the passive litigants are re-
quired to appear for questioning and are subject to often stiff interrogation by 
opposing counsel with the concomitant need for counsel of their own.” Id. 
 116. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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the courts have developed a process under Rule 23(e) during 
which objecting class members can be heard and can request 
exclusion from the settlement, resulting in court approval if the 
settlement is fair and adequate.117 A settlement approved pur-
suant to Rule 23(e) binds all members of the class who did not 
request exclusion, as well as the defendant.118 A class member 
who requests exclusion does not prevent effectuation of a court-
approved settlement and the consequent termination of the lit-
igation, but the class member may file a new action.119 
By contrast, in an action under section 16(b) of the FLSA, 
each opt-in is a “party plaintiff” and must consent to the set-
tlement of his or her claim. Defendants, who understandably 
want a settlement to terminate the litigation completely, often 
condition offers to the individual plaintiffs, or a lump-sum offer 
to all plaintiffs, on acceptance by all the plaintiffs. Securing 
such consent can be onerous for counsel and can place counsel 
in an ethically treacherous position120 if one or more plaintiffs 
refuse to settle or holds out for a larger share of a lump-sum of-
fer, thereby jeopardizing the settlement for the entire group. 
While judicial supervision of the settlement process is possi-
ble121 and judicial approval may actually be essential for a 
binding settlement,122 courts have not developed any mechan-
ism under section 16(b) for approval of a class-wide settlement 
over the objection of a single opt-in plaintiff. Thus, despite the 
 
 117. See, e.g., In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., No. 296, 1980 WL 
1994, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 1980) (giving an example of a settlement objec-
tion procedure). 
 118. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 392 (D. Mass. 1979) 
(noting that class members are bound unless they exclude themselves).  
 119. ALDA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 16:18 (4th ed. 2002). 
 120. American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model 
Rules) Rule 1.8(g) governs a lawyer’s participation in a lump sum or aggregate 
settlement when the lawyer represents multiple potential beneficiaries of the 
settlement. It provides, “A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not 
participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of . . . the clients 
. . . unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. 
The lawyer’s disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims 
. . . involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.” MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2005) (emphases added). 
 121. See, e.g., Woodall v. Drake Hotel, 913 F.2d 447, 450–52 (7th Cir. 
1990).  
 122. This is due to the fact that employees cannot waive their rights under 
the FLSA, see Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 723, 940 
(1981), except under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor, see 29 U.S.C. 
§ 216(c) (2000). It is widely accepted that judicial supervision is also sufficient 
to render a waiver that is part of a settlement agreement binding.  
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fact that litigation of FLSA claims under section 16(b) typically 
involves far fewer plaintiffs and far lower damage awards than 
litigation under Rule 23, their settlement remains more diffi-
cult and cumbersome.  
E. ETHICAL AMBIGUITIES 
The anomalous status of opt-in plaintiffs under section 
16(b) extends to their relationship to counsel. The rules of legal 
ethics impose numerous requirements on an attorney who 
forms an attorney-client relationship with an individual client. 
Many states, for example, require a written, signed retainer 
agreement under certain circumstances.123 Various obligations 
of disclosure, for example, of potential conflicts, are also im-
posed on attorneys in relation to individual clients.124 In a class 
action, it is well established that these obligations run only to 
the named plaintiffs and that the fidelity of counsel to the class 
is insured by a judicial finding that the named plaintiffs and 
their counsel will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class” as well as by continued court supervision.125 
As under the rules of discovery, however, the peculiar sta-
tus of opt-in plaintiffs under section 16(b) confounds the rules 
of ethics and places plaintiffs’ counsel in a veritable minefield 
of ethical dilemmas. In a large case where hundreds and even 
thousands of employees opt in, is counsel obligated to insure 
that he or she has a signed, written retainer agreement with 
each opt-in plaintiff? How long can counsel continue to 
represent opt-in plaintiffs in the absence of a retainer agree-
ment? Must counsel inform each such opt-in, in writing, that 
there is a potential conflict between him or her and all other 
plaintiffs, if, for example, defendant makes a lump-sum settle-
ment offer to the entire group? And must counsel obtain each 
individual opt-in plaintiffs’ written consent to continued repre-
sentation under the disclosed circumstances? While workers 
who are unfamiliar with the rules of ethics, as a practical mat-
ter, have no alternative counsel, and have no interest in assert-
 
 123. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (stating that a 
contingent fee agreement must be in writing). 
 124. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7(b)(4) (stating that informed written consent is ne-
cessary if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client”). 
 125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).  
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ing abstract rights as clients that would undermine their abili-
ty to enforce their rights as employees, are unlikely to raise 
these issues, employers are likely to seek advantage by exploit-
ing these ambiguities in the application of the rules in motions 
to disqualify counsel, strike consent forms, and dismiss claims. 
While there is a paucity of precedent addressing these issues, 
courts should not permit defendants to use the rules of ethics 
as a sword to impose obligations on counsel in relation to each 
plaintiff who opts in under section 16(b), which would frustrate 
Congress’s clear intent to facilitate collective enforcement of the 
FLSA. 
F. SECTION 16(B)’S CORROSIVE EFFECT ON ENFORCEMENT OF 
STATE WAGE-AND-HOUR LAWS  
Precisely because of the limitations created by section 
16(b), representatives of aggrieved employees often join claims 
under the FLSA with claims under parallel state wage-and-
hour laws.126 State law may be more favorable to employees in 
a variety of substantive respects, and, more importantly, no 
state wage-and-hour law that we are aware of contains a re-
striction parallel to section 16(b). In other words, claims under 
state wage-and-hour laws can be pursued as ordinary class ac-
tions. Since 1990, when Congress amended the provision go-
verning federal courts’ jurisdiction to decide pendent state-law 
claims to create jurisdiction over not only pendent claims but 
also pendent parties (in this case, similarly situated employees 
who do not opt in) so long as they assert claims arising out of 
the same nucleus of operative facts,127 there have been a large 
 
 126. Of course, not all states have such laws. For example, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina do not. See U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, Minimum Wage Laws in the States, http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/ 
america.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). Also, not all state laws are as protec-
tive as the FLSA. See id. 
 127. The Supreme Court had held that pendent party jurisdiction did not 
exist in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989). Congress responded 
in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 by extending supplemental jurisdic-
tion to pendent parties. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)). The arguments outlined below concerning the exercise 
of supplemental jurisdiction over class-wide, state-law claims are inapplicable 
to claims over which there is federal jurisdiction under the newly enacted 
Class Action Fairness Act, i.e., where the amount in controversy is over 
$5 million and any member of the class is a citizen of a different state than 
any defendants so long as less than two-thirds of the plaintiffs and the prima-
ry defendants are not citizens of the state in which the action was filed. See 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 10 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006)).  
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number of such “hybrid” actions filed in the federal courts. In 
response, employers have crafted a variety of arguments aimed 
at convincing federal courts that the limitations of section 16(b) 
should be read to effectively bar certification of a Rule 23 class 
for purposes of pursuing pendent state wage-and-hour 
claims.128  
Employers have argued that certifying a class to pursue 
parallel state claims would circumvent section 16(b) and, there-
fore, that federal courts may not exercise supplemental juris-
diction over the claims of any employees who do not opt in.129 
This argument rests on the suggestion, articulated by the Third 
Circuit, that there is a “general federal interest in opt-in wage 
actions” that extends beyond the express limitation on FLSA 
actions.130 Pursuing parallel state-law claims on a class-wide 
basis, employers argue, undermines the federal policy embo-
died in section 16(b). As one district court observed,  
There are powerful policy considerations that led Congress to change 
the original version of the Fair Labor Standards Act by enacting the 
Portal-to-Portal Act. . . . That policy and the underlying congressional 
intent would be thwarted if a plaintiff were permitted to back door 
the shoehorning in of unnamed parties through the vehicle of calling 
upon similar state statutes that lack such an opt-in requirement.131  
While some federal district courts have embraced this asserted, 
derivative limitation on their authority to enforce state wage-
and-hour law on a class-wide basis,132 the majority of courts, 
including the D.C. Circuit, have rejected the argument. These 
 
 128. This Section of our Article benefited greatly from reading James Reif, 
Some Thoughts on the Opt-In/Opt-Out Conundrum in Group Wage/Hour Liti-
gation, LAB. L. EXCHANGE (forthcoming 2008), and Andrew Brunsden, Hybrid 
Class Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage Law Enforcement in the Federal 
Courts, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2008). 
 129. Moeck v. Gray Supply Corp., No. 03-1950 (WGB), 2006 WL 42368, at 
*5 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2006).  
 130. De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 131. Rodriguez v. Texan, No. 01 C 1478, 2001 WL 1829490, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 7, 2001). 
 132. See, e.g., Linsday v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 355 F. Supp. 2d 119, 
120–21 (D.D.C. 2004), rev’d, 448 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2006); McClain v. Leona’s 
Pizzeria, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 574, 578 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that certifying the 
state-law class “would undermine Congress’s directive that FLSA collective 
actions [be] limited to those parties who opt in to the action”); Leuthold v. Des-
tination Am., Inc., 222 F.R.D. 462, 470 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Many of these deci-
sions cite the statement in LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 
289 (5th Cir. 1975), which held that section 16(b) and Rule 23 “class actions 
are mutually exclusive and irreconcilable.” But LaChapelle involved the ques-
tion of whether a class could be certified to pursue an ADEA claim, not a pa-
rallel state-law claim. Id. at 287. 
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courts reason that “section 216(b) [does] not expressly prohibit 
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law 
claims of opt-out class members”—as required to bar supple-
mental jurisdiction under the amended jurisdiction statute.133 
As one district court succinctly put it, section 16(b) “does not 
guarantee that employers will never face traditional class ac-
tions pursuant to state employment law.”134 These courts are 
surely correct not only for that reason but because, as we ex-
plain above, the divergence of section 16(b) and Rule 23 juri-
sprudence was more the result of historical accident than deli-
berate congressional action that can properly be understood to 
have created a “federal interest in opt-in wage actions.”135 
Recognizing that federal courts are not precluded from ex-
ercising supplemental jurisdiction over parallel state-law 
claims on a class-wide basis by the unwarranted extension of 
the nonexistent federal policy allegedly underlying section 
16(b), employers still rely on the very limitations of section 
16(b) to argue that courts should nevertheless exercise their 
 
 133. Lindsay, 448 F.3d at 422. Congress has provided for federal court ju-
risdiction “[e]xcept . . . as expressly provided otherwise by federal statute.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added). See also Marquez v. PartyLite Worldwide, 
Inc., No. 07 C 2024, 2007 WL 2461667, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007); Scholti-
sek v. Eldre Corp., 229 F.R.D. 381, 391–94 (W.D.N.Y. 2005); McLaughlin v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 304, 308 (D. Mass. 2004) (“I should not, how-
ever, infer from that restriction on federal remedies a concomitant restriction 
on state remedies. Nothing in the statute limits available remedies under state 
law.”); Goldman v. Radioshack Corp., No. Civ.A. 2:03-CV-0032, 2003 WL 
21250571, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2003) (“The clear weight of authority is in 
favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction.”). 
 134. Klein v. Ryan Beck Holdings, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 3460(WCC), 2007 WL 
2059828, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007). The Court continued, “the FLSA’s col-
lective action mandate applies only to actions brought pursuant to the FLSA—
not to employment law actions generally. . . . The FLSA contains no provision 
preempting other methods of prosecuting state law employment litigation.” Id. 
at *5; see also De Leon-Grandos v. Eller & Sons Trees, Inc., 497 F.3d 1214, 
1220 (11th Cir. 2007) (“If Congress intended § 216 to be the exclusive remedy 
for violations of [another statute’s] wage payment provision, it would have said 
so.”). The employer’s argument in Klein was actually a variant of the above-
described argument based on the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 
(2000). The employer argued that section 16(b) vests a right in employers not 
to be sued by an employee who has not affirmatively opted into an action and, 
correspondingly, vests a right in employees not to be bound by a judgment in 
any action into which they have not affirmatively opted. The employer argued 
that certifying a class to pursue a parallel state-law claim would abridge those 
rights in violations of the Enabling Act. The Court rejected the argument as 
have all others that have considered it. Klein, 2007 WL 2059828, at *6. 
 135. De Asencio, 342 F.3d at 312. 
BECKERSTRAUSS_4FMT 5/24/2008 11:36 AM 
1344 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1317 
 
discretion to decline such jurisdiction.136 For example, precisely 
because following section 16(b) procedures is likely to lead to 
only a small fraction of the class opting into the litigation, em-
ployers have argued that the state-law wage-and-hour claim 
“substantially predominates” over the federal FLSA claim and 
thus the courts should decline supplemental jurisdiction.137  
In De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., for example, only 447 of 
the 4100 potential plaintiffs opted in.138 Based on those num-
bers, the Third Circuit reasoned that 
[p]redomination under section 1367 generally goes to the type of 
claim, not the number of parties involved. But the disparity in num-
bers of similarly situated plaintiffs may be so great that it becomes 
dispositive by transforming the action to a substantial degree, by 
causing the federal tail represented by a comparatively small number 
of plaintiffs to wag what is in substance a state dog.139 
Based on the failure of the section 16(b) process, together 
with differences in the proof required for the federal and state 
claims, the court concluded that declining jurisdiction over the 
state-law claims of absent class members was within the trial 
court’s discretion.140 But a mere disparity in the number of opt-
ins compared to the potential size of a state class should not 
alone lead to the conclusion that state law issues will predomi-
nate when the legal and factual issues under federal and state 
law are parallel141 or when the members of the putative state-
law class have highly parallel claims so that the size of the 
class will not greatly affect the evidence that will be necessary 
or the scope of the issues that will be raised under state law.142 
Yet this argument continues to have currency in a minority of 
federal courts.143  
 
 136. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (permitting federal courts to decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction). 
 137. See id. § 1367(c)(2). 
 138. 342 F.3d at 310. 
 139. Id. at 311. 
 140. Id. at 312–13.  
 141. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Corp., 448 F.3d 416, 424–25 
(D.C. Cir. 2006); Chavez v. IBP, Inc., No. CT-01-5093-EFS, 2002 WL 
31662302, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2002) (“[T]he Court does not view sheer 
numbers as the relevant comparison. Rather, the determining factor is the 
relative size of the issues raised by the varying claims.”). The governing sta-
tute refers to the predominance of the state “claim” over the federal “claim or 
claims” not to the number of claimants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).  
 142. See, e.g., Marquez v. PartyLite Worldwide, Inc., No. 07 C 2024, 2007 
WL 2461667, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007). 
 143. See, e.g., Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 470 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004). 
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In those rare cases when the use of section 16(b) proce-
dures results in a substantial number of similarly situated em-
ployees opting into the litigation, employers turn the previous 
argument on its head. Employers argue both that Rule 23(a)’s 
requirement that joinder be “impracticable” and that Rule 
23(b)(3)’s requirement that “a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy” are not satisfied.144 Based on the first argument, 
some courts defer ruling on certification until the close of the 
opt-in period in order to be “better equipped to determine if 
joinder is impracticable.”145 If only a few employees opt in, the 
employer will assert the previously described argument that 
the state tail will wag the federal dog, while if a large number 
of employees opt in, the employer will argue that joinder is not 
impracticable. And even if only a few opt in, the employer will 
argue that section 16(b) provides a “superior” method because 
it provides any employee “truly” interested in participating in 
the action with that opportunity.146 But, as we explained in 
Part IV.A above, failure to return a consent form is not reliable 
evidence of lack of interest in participating in the case. Moreo-
ver, section 16(b) provides a method for similarly situated em-
ployees to become parties to the FLSA claims, not the state-law 
claims.147 The section 16(b) procedure is not even an “available 
method[] for the fair and efficient adjudication of the [state 
law] controversy.”148 Thus, a section 16(b) opt-in proceeding is 
not a superior means of resolving state-law claims that should 
be addressed on a class-wide basis using Rule 23. 
Finally, employers argue that the mere difference between 
section 16(b), in particular its opt-in requirement, and Rule 23, 
in particular its opt-out requirement, will cause confusion and 
therefore that a class action is not a superior means of resolv-
ing the claims and that difficulties will be encountered in the 
management of the class action.149 But confusion can be re-
 
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(3). 
 145. De la Fuente v. FPM Ipsen Heat Treating, Inc., No. 02 C 50188, 2002 
WL 31819226, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2002). 
 146. See, e.g., Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 469 (“[T]he FLSA suit provides a 
means of participating for individuals who truly wish to join the suit.”); 
McClain v. Leona’s Pizzeria, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 574, 578 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Muecke 
v. A-Reliable Auto Parts & Wreckers, Inc., No. 01 C 2361, 2002 WL 1359411, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 21, 2002). 
 147. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 148. Id. (emphasis added). 
 149. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(A) & (B)(3)(d); see also Chase v. Aimco Props., 
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duced by sending the section 16(b) notice giving employees the 
opportunity to opt in before the Rule 23 notice giving employees 
the opportunity to opt out and also through well-drafted notic-
es. Moreover, more confusion will likely result if the state-law 
claims proceed in state court and thus employees receive two 
different notices from two different courts.150 
While the arguments that the peculiar limitations in sec-
tion 16(b) should, directly or indirectly, preclude federal court 
certification of a class to pursue parallel state wage-and-hour 
claims are ultimately unsound, they have proved persuasive to 
some courts and represent one more handicap imposed on em-
ployees seeking to enforce minimum employment standards.151  
  CONCLUSION   
The Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the 
FLSA “are remedial and humanitarian in purpose,” instructing 
that the “statute must not be interpreted or applied in a nar-
row, grudging manner.”152 Yet the seemingly modest restriction 
contained in section 16(b), in practice, is both narrow and 
grudging, particularly as applied to low-wage workers, the pri-
mary victims of FLSA violations. Adopted in 1947, section 16(b) 
unintentionally caused group litigation under the FLSA to di-
verge from virtually all other forms of group litigation in the 
federal courts since Rule 23 was amended in 1963. This diver-
gence has no rationale, is poor public policy, and handicaps one 
of the must vulnerable sectors of society in the enforcement of 
 
L.P., 374 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 150. See Cryer v. InterSolutions, Inc., No. 06-2032 (EGS), 2007 WL 
1191928, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2007). 
 151. Employees can, of course, file hybrid actions in state court. See 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (providing that actions can be filed “in any Federal or 
State court of competent jurisdiction”). While employers can remove such ac-
tions to federal court, see Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 
691 (2003), several federal district courts have held that after removing the 
case to federal court the employer cannot make the above-described argu-
ments. See, e.g., Acosta v. Scott Labor, No. 05 C 2518, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
153 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2006); Yon v. Positive Connections, No. 04-C-2680, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3396 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2005). Otherwise, they reason, plain-
tiffs will be encouraged to split their claims, filing state-law claims in state 
court and FLSA claims in federal court. Yon, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3396, at 
*3–4. However, other courts express skepticism on this point, pointing out that 
in federal courts federal procedural rules apply to state claims. See Marquez v. 
PartyLite Worldwide, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63301, at *17 (N.D. Ill. 
2007). 
 152. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 
597 (1944).  
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their rights to fair wages. If Congress wishes to truly adopt a 
Class Action Fairness Act,153 it will amend section 16(b) to re-
move the opt-in requirement154 and thereby harmonize the law 
of collective actions under the FLSA with the rules applied to 
virtually all other causes of action brought on behalf of a class 
in the federal and state courts. 
 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2000). 
 154. Congress should also remove the corresponding provisions concerning 
the tolling of the statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. § 256. 
